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The recent spread of ATM surcharges has sparked significant debate among consumers, policymakers,
and ATM owners. Much of this debate has focused on the direct costs that surcharges impose on 
consumers. The use of ATM surcharges, however, also raises broader questions about ATM 
deployment, customer convenience, and the nature of banking competition. 
ATM Networks and ATM Fees 
Most ATM networks are organized as joint ventures
owned by a central group of bank members.2 A network
provides an array of services that link together the
ATMs of its members. The activities of the network are
governed by a set of rules agreed to and implemented
by the network’s board of directors. 
ATM network organizations engage in a host of activi-
ties that support the trademark, brand name, reliability,
and operation of the ATM system controlled by the net-
work. The basic operational activity of the network is to
support ATM cash withdrawals by the deposit account
holders of any member bank. This function requires the
network to transfer electronically, or “switch,” the trans-
action information from the ATM to the account holder’s
bank and back again. This communication and sorting
activity is accomplished through the aid of leased or 
dial-up telephone lines and centralized computers. Many 
networks also provide ancillary services such as ATM 
servicing and clearing and settlement of payments to their
members or other banks. 
ATM services entail two types of fees: wholesale
fees, which are paid by the banks to other banks or to
the network, and retail fees, which are paid by the per-
son conducting the transaction to his or her bank or to
the ATM owner (see box). 
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In April 1996, the two largest national automated teller
machine (ATM) networks, Plus and Cirrus, ended their
prohibition on direct fees for using an ATM. Since that
decision, many banks and nonbanks that own machines
have chosen to impose these fees, known as surcharges,
on users who are not depositors of the machine owner.
Surveys show that these fees, which can reach as high
as $5.00, average about $1.00.1
The relatively sudden appearance of ATM surcharges
has led to a large increase in the cost of ATM transac-
tions to some consumers. This cost burden has
prompted significant public debate, which in turn has
led many state legislatures and congressional subcom-
mittees to consider bills to ban surcharges.
This edition of Current Issues provides a brief
overview of the organization of ATM networks, the fees
they charge member financial institutions (most of
which are banks), and the fees banks and ATM owners
charge consumers for ATM services. It then looks at the
potential effects of surcharges on ATM deployment and
bank competition. We find that surcharges appear to
have led to a significant increase in the number of
ATMs, but they inconvenience some consumers and
may weaken price competition among banks in the long
run. Finally, the article examines the surcharge policy
options facing the United States today.FRBNY 2
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Wholesale fees are set by ATM networks and comprise
the switch fee and the interchange fee. (Most networks
also charge a membership fee, which is not transaction-
based.) Switch fees, which range from $0.02 to $0.15 per
transaction, are paid by the cardholder bank to the net-
work to cover the costs of routing transactions through the
network’s computer-switching system. The interchange
fee is paid by the cardholder’s bank to the ATM owner to
compensate the owner for the costs of deploying and ser-
vicing the ATM; interchange fees typically range from
$0.30 to $0.60 per transaction. In addition to compen-
sating ATM owners, the networkwide interchange fee is
designed to standardize the arrangements that enable
member banks’ cardholders to use an ATM owner’s
machines (Baxter 1983). By fixing a single price for all
interchange transactions among its many members, a 
network avoids numerous interbank negotiations.
The retail fees of an ATM transaction are set by the
cardholder’s bank and by the ATM owner. When a card-
holder uses an ATM that is not owned by his or her
bank, the cardholder’s bank may charge a user fee to
cover the interchange fee that it must pay to the ATM
owner. User fees, also called “foreign fees,” range from
$0.25 to $2.50, and average about $1.00 per transaction.
Surcharges also fall under the category of retail fees.
As noted, banks that own ATMs typically surcharge
other banks’ depositors rather than their own account
holders.3 Surcharges vary widely, ranging from as little
as $0.50 to as much as $5.00, but they average about
$1.00 per transaction.
ATM Surcharges: The Pros and Cons 
Surcharges entail both benefits and costs for ATM
owners, consumers, banks, and ATM networks. The
primary benefit of surcharges is that they have the
potential to lead to a better match between the supply of
ATM locations and customer demand for remote access
to their bank accounts (Salop 1990, 1991). ATM sur-
charges, however, also impose direct costs on con-
sumers and may have long-term consequences for
transaction volume and banking competition. We review
these pros and cons in our analysis of the effects of
ATM surcharges on deployment, customer convenience,
ATM transaction fees, and banking competition.
ATM Deployment 
The introduction of surcharges appears to have resulted in
one important customer advantage: a better match
between customer demand for ATMs and ATM deploy-
ment. In particular, surcharges encourage the deployment
of ATMs to areas that are too expensive for interchange
fees alone to support, such as airports, casinos, football
stadiums, and ski resorts. By lowering the number of
transactions needed to generate sufficient revenue for
owners to recoup ATM costs, surcharges can encourage
ATM Transaction Fees
Fees for ATM services fall into two broad categories: wholesale fees and retail fees. 
Fee  Category Set by  Description Fee per Transaction
Switch fee  Wholesale ATM   Fee paid by cardholder’s  $0.02 to $0.15
network bank to network organization
for the costs of routing
transaction information
Interchange fee  Wholesale ATM  Fee paid by cardholder’s  $0.30 to $0.60
network bank to ATM owner for
costs of deploying and
maintaining shared ATM
User fee  Retail Cardholder’s  Fee paid by cardholder  $0.25 to $2.50
(or foreign fee) bank to cardholder’s bank for 
using an ATM not owned 
by the cardholder’s bank
ATM surcharge  Retail ATM Fee paid by cardholder  $0.50 to $5.00
owner to ATM owner for the 
costs of deploying and
maintaining the ATM3
deployers to maintain ATMs in high-cost, high-value
locations.
If surcharges promote ATM deployment, we would
expect to find that ATM installations have increased
since surcharges were permitted in 1996. Indeed, from
1996 to 1997, the number of ATMs in the United States
increased 18.5 percent, the fastest rate of growth in 
fifteen years (Chart 1). At the same time, the number of
transactions per machine fell rapidly, indicating that the
number of machines has grown faster than the total
number of transactions. Thus, ATM deployers find 
it profitable to continue to deploy ATMs even though
the number of transactions per ATM is lower than 
in previous years. This fact is consistent with the
hypothesis that surcharges allow machines to be placed
in higher cost, lower volume locations.
From 1996 to 1997, the number of machines located
off bank premises also increased—further evidence that
surcharges may have improved customer access to
ATMs (Chart 2).4 Much of the transaction volume at
off-premise machines is provided by customers who
have accounts at banks other than the bank that owns
the ATM. The interchange and surcharge revenues col-
lected from these transactions help owners to recover
the higher costs of maintaining off-premise machines.
Anecdotal evidence also supports the hypothesis that
surcharges have influenced the growth in the number of
ATMs: ATM deployers indicate that surcharges have
been a leading factor in the business decisions that have
led to the recent acceleration in the growth of ATMs.5
Customer Convenience
Although surcharges may enable individuals to access
their accounts from an increased number of locations,
they also have the potential to disrupt the convenience
supplied by ATM networks. Networks provide this
convenience by linking ATMs in a shared system
owned by many different parties and by allowing card-
holders from many banks to access accounts from any
ATM in the network. Surcharges have reduced this
convenience by “taxing” transactions in which a card-
holder of one bank uses an ATM that is not owned by
his or her bank. It follows that if a new tax is placed
on a service, we would likely see a decline in the use
of that service.
A review of ATM activity reveals that in 1997 the
volume of interchange transactions (transactions in
which a cardholder uses an ATM that is not owned by
his or her bank) fell for the first time since ATMs
became available. The sizable drop in interchange
transactions of roughly 10 percent occurred even as the
number of off-premise machines and the overall num-
ber of ATM transactions increased. 
The decrease in interchange transactions suggests
that consumers have changed their pattern of ATM
usage. To avoid surcharges, many consumers are likely
visiting ATMs that are less convenient than those they
had used previously. Consumers may also be withdraw-
ing and carrying larger amounts of cash each time they
use an ATM to spread the costs of a surcharge over a
larger dollar value. A decision by customers to reduce
the number of visits to ATMs could erode the conve-
nience that a network is designed to offer. 
Transaction Fees
Some ATM owners stand to gain from an increase in
revenues resulting from ATM transactions. Each time a
customer who is not an account holder withdraws
money, the ATM owner collects the surcharge—in addi-
tion to the interchange fee. Given that approximately
1,700 interchange transactions take place at an average
ATM every month, these additional fees can amount to
significant earnings. Although the number of inter-
change transactions has fallen, ATM owners are
nonetheless motivated to surcharge, because in doing
so they capture a larger share of the benefits of the net-
work economy. Before such fees were introduced, the
benefits of the increased availability of ATMs flowed
more directly to the cardholder’s bank.
Although surcharges boost the earnings of ATM
owners, they may also impose costs—in the form of
customer losses—on both ATM networks and network
banks. An ATM transaction has two components: the
information provided by the cardholder’s bank, and the
machine and cash supplied by the ATM owner. The two
parts of this transaction are complements. When these
Chart 1
Number of U.S. ATMs and Monthly Transactions per ATM
Source:  Bank Network News, annual Data Book.
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Thousands of ATMs Thousands of transactionstwo pieces are sold independently (by setting a user, or
foreign, fee payable to the account-holding bank and a
surcharge payable to the ATM owner), the sum of the
prices may discourage customers from engaging in the
transaction. Moreover, the existence of dual providers
makes it less likely that either provider will consider
how the fees will influence customer behavior.
This effect of “double marginalization” is well
known in economics. A recent study of this issue shows
that pricing ATM transactions using surcharges leads to
higher prices on average than does pricing transactions
using interchange fees alone (Economides and Salop
1992). Significantly, the double margin effect does not
come into play when a single provider oversees the two
sides of the transaction. Thus, a bank—as a single
provider with its own chain of ATMs—has control over
both sides of the transaction and can price its ATM ser-
vices attractively. As a result, customers have an incen-
tive to use their own banks’machines. 
The likelihood that surcharges are prompting
increasing numbers of ATM customers to use their own
banks’machines in place of network machines has clear
negative implications for the networks. This substitu-
tion has already led to fewer interchange transactions
and reduced revenue from switch fees for the networks.
As single banks expand their operations to other areas
of their home states and to other parts of the country,
the potential for substitution could increase. 
Long-Term Effects on Competition
A broader risk of surcharges is their potential to alter
long-term competition among banks.6 By exempting the
customers of ATM owners from surcharges, the current
system reduces the role of the shared ATM network to
which a bank belongs and expands the role of the bank’s
own chain of machines. This arrangement encourages
customers who prize convenience to establish deposit
accounts with banks that have ATMs located in the cus-
tomers’ preferred locations rather than with banks that
offer the highest interest rates on deposit accounts.
Hence, surcharges can change the nature of competition
among banks for deposits by reducing customers’sensi-
tivity to deposit interest rates. Indeed, banks may
choose to increase the intensity of competition in ATM
locations and to decrease the intensity of price competi-
tion in deposit interest rates. 
Models of nonprice competition show that such com-
petition can lead to some undesirable consequences,
including two that are relevant to ATM surcharges.7
First, banks could “overdeploy” ATMs. For example, to
avoid becoming less competitive, two banks may deploy
ATMs in the same location, a strategy that would result
in lower transactions per machine but would not neces-
sarily increase customer convenience. Moreover, because
of the increased costs of servicing two machines in one
location, the competition between the two machine-
owners might not always lead to lower prices.
To the extent that customers become more respon-
sive to the number and the location of a bank’s ATMs
and less responsive to deposit interest rates, weakened
deposit interest rate competition among banks could
result in lower interest rates on deposits in the long run.
This consequence may be considered a reasonable
trade-off by those customers who place a high value on
convenience and have chosen the bank with the most
convenient ATM network; however, customers who do
not rely as heavily on ATM location would bear the
costs of the added convenience.
Public Policy Today 
Consumers, banks, and legislators have been engaged in
lively debate over surcharges ever since these fees were
introduced in 1996. Consumers paying user fees and
surcharges argue that they are being charged twice for
the same transaction.8 An open question is whether sur-
charges are location-specific. If surcharges are largely
restricted to ATMs in high-value, high-cost locations,
then consumers are paying an additional fee for an addi-
tional benefit. If surcharges are not location-specific,
however, consumers’ claim that they are paying a 
double fee for a single service may be valid. The empir-
ical evidence is not yet sufficient to determine whether
ATM deployers set their surcharges on a location-
specific basis, although some evidence suggests that
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Chart 2
Volume of Interchange Activity and Percentage 
of Off-Premise ATMs
Source:  Bank Network News, annual Data Book.
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97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90 89 88 87 86 85 84 83 1982banks tend to set the same rate for all their machines
(Bank Network News 1997b, 1997c).9
One response to consumers’ dislike of surcharges—
the formation of no-surcharge networks—has been hin-
dered by existing network bylaws. Most ATM networks
currently stipulate that all cardholders of network mem-
ber banks must be treated in the same way at network
ATMs. In practice, this means that a group of banks can-
not ban surcharges for their customers if other banks in
the network charge them. Nevertheless, a growing num-
ber of networks have revised their rules to accommodate
no-surcharge subnetworks, and some states have also
begun to make way for these groups. For example, in
1997 Georgia passed legislation invalidating the
nondiscrimination policy of ATM networks doing busi-
ness in that state (Bank Network News 1997c).
Also in response to consumer complaints, two con-
gressional hearings have focused on the issue of sur-
charges. Various bills have been introduced in Congress
to ban ATM surcharges and to mandate that a consumer
be informed at the ATM of all transaction charges.10
Complicating the legislative debate is the fact that state
laws do not address the issue of surcharges in a uniform
way. Recently, in Connecticut and Iowa, for example,
banking regulators have gone so far as to rule that sur-
charges are illegal. In contrast, in the early 1990s, fif-
teen states passed into law legislation that made existing
no-surcharge agreements illegal (Bank Network News
1997d). These laws were passed before most networks
allowed surcharges and were likely intended to allow
banks greater latitude in their price-setting decisions.
Today, however, these laws may impede the competitive
response to surcharges by restricting the freedom of
groups of banks to form no-surcharge networks.11
Proponents of bills that ban ATM surcharges alto-
gether argue that such legislation would end the practice
of double charging consumers. Critics, however, claim
that such bans would limit private businesses’ right to
recover the costs of their services. The critics of sur-
charge bans also argue that, in the long-run, regulation
of ATM networks may set a precedent that weakens the
joint venture form of business.12 Conceivably, such leg-
islation could discourage banks from developing goods
for which the joint venture is a useful form of gover-
nance. Many other electronic banking products—such
as credit cards, point-of-sale debit systems, and elec-
tronic payment systems—are provided through joint
ventures. Finally, critics assert that state actions to regu-
late network bylaws or to ban no-surcharge networks
have limited ATM networks’ ability to set their own
business policies. 
Public policy toward surcharges today reflects wide-
spread action at the state level to adjust the rules of
ATM networks to promote an adequate competitive
balance within and between ATM networks. Still, con-
flicts remain: two state banking regulators ban sur-
charges, while fifteen states prohibit the formation of
no-surcharge networks. Moreover, at least one state has
overturned a central rule of ATM networks requiring
nondiscriminatory treatment of cardholders at network
ATMs. The end result is that multistate networks are
forced to adopt different policies for different states. 
What can consumers expect for the ATM transac-
tions that have become a routine part of daily life? The
widespread adoption of surcharges by ATM owners sug-
gests that surcharging will continue. Nevertheless,
action at the state level is likely to affect the ease with
which surcharges are implemented. If the states that
prohibit no-surcharge agreements lift these restrictions,
the number of no-surcharge networks could rise. Such a
development might ultimately prompt the owners of
competing ATMs to lower their fees.
Notes
1. According to a survey reported in Bank Network News (1997a),
roughly half of the ATMs in the nation assess surcharges. Similar
numbers are reported in earlier surveys of the prevalence of 
surcharging (U.S. General Accounting Office 1997; U.S. Public
Interest Research Group 1997). Some proprietors refer to sur-
charges as access fees, convenience fees, or noncustomer conve-
nience fees.
2. In a small number of cases, the networks are owned by all mem-
ber banks or by nonbank data-processing firms.
3. Nonbank ATM owners typically surcharge all customers.
4. Some of these machines are being deployed by nonbanks.
Electronic Data Systems, for example, is the third leading deployer
of ATMs (Bank Network News 1997b). However, banks still deploy
the great majority of ATMs.
5. See U.S. House (1996). In addition to the relaxation of the sur-
charge bans, other events that may have contributed to the increased
deployment of ATMs include the steady economic expansion in the
last several years, new lower cost, no-frills ATMs, and an increasing
number of interstate banking organizations.
6. See Horvitz (1996) for a discussion of the effects of surcharges
on retail deposit market competition among banks.
7. See, for example, Gilbert (1989) for a discussion of competition
under product differentiation.
8. One legislator has attempted to get around the issue of double
fees by abolishing the interchange fee and allowing the ATM owner
to collect all the revenue for the transaction through a surcharge.
Ohio introduced a bill to this effect. 
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9. Two factors might lead a bank to set a uniform rate for all its
machines. First, a bank may find it too difficult and costly to set fees
on a location-specific basis. If this is the case, raising the inter-
change fee generally might suffice to eliminate surcharges. Second,
a bank competing for deposits might wish to surcharge all non-
depositors to encourage them to open an account at the bank.
10. In 1996, Senator Alfonse D’Amato of New York introduced the
Fair ATM Fees for Consumers Act, S.1800, which would ban sur-
charges, and Representative Charles Schumer of New York intro-
duced a bill requiring disclosure of all ATM fees at the time of the
transaction. 
11. Furthermore, as one network executive has indicated, the differ-
ing laws among the states were a factor in the networks’decision to
overturn their prohibitions on surcharges. See U.S. House (1996).
12. For a discussion of the negative effects of state membership
requirements for ATM networks (commonly called mandatory shar-
ing laws) on ATM deployment and network growth, see Laderman
(1990).
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